

# refugee council information



European Council on Refugee and Exiles (ECRE)

UK Country Report for 2005

August 2006

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## Background

The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) publishes annual country reports for the previous year for 27 European states. The reports contain information about major policy and legal developments in those countries, along with statistics on asylum applications.

The Refugee Council writes the response for the UK, with the assistance of the Refugee Legal Centre and the Scottish Refugee Council. This briefing contains the UK report for 2005.

The full ECRE Country Reports for 2005 will be available shortly at: <http://www.ecre.org/>

## United Kingdom

### Arrivals

#### 1. Total number of applications for asylum lodged, with monthly breakdown and percentage variation between years

Table 1

Month	2004	2005	Variation +/- (%)
January	3,040	2,635	-13
February	2,905	2,215	-23
March	3,010	2,165	-28
April	2,635	2,185	-17
May	2,550	1,975	-22
June	2,725	2,065	-24
July	2,865	1,980	-30
August	2,685	2,150	-18
Sept.	3,065	2,190	-28
October	2,815	2,070	-26
November	2,885	2,105	-26
December	2,780	1,990	-28
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>33,960</b>	<b>25,720</b>	<b>-24</b>

Source: Home Office, Research Development and Statistics  
 Figures do not include dependants.

#### 2. Breakdown according to the country of origin/nationality of applicant, with percentage variation

Table 2

Country	2004	2005	Variation +/- (%)
Iran	3,455	3,140	-9
Somalia	2,585	1,770	-31
Eritrea	1,105	1,760	+60
China	2,365	1,735	-27
Afghanistan	1,395	1,585	+13
Iraq	1,695	1,435	-16
Pakistan	1,710	1,145	-33
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	1,475	1,060	-28
Zimbabwe	2,065	1,070	-48
India	1,405	970	-31
Others	14,705	10,050	-31

Source: Home Office, Research Development and Statistics  
 Figures do not include dependants.

### 3. Persons arriving under family reunification procedure

No figures available.

### 4. Refugees arriving as part of a resettlement programme

In 2005, 136 refugees arrived under the UK resettlement programme. (See Q 27 for further details).

Source: Home Office

### 5. Unaccompanied minors

In 2005, the UK received 2,720 applications for asylum from unaccompanied children (subject to change, as there is often late recording of applications from unaccompanied children). The main countries of origin were\*:

Afghanistan	485
Iran	395
Somalia	220
Eritrea	175
Iraq	165
China	150
Democratic Republic of Congo	135
Vietnam	110

These countries accounted for 1835 of applications from unaccompanied children.

Source: Home Office, Research Development and Statistics

\*Figures have been rounded to the nearest five.

## Recognition rates

### 6. The statuses accorded at first instance and appeal stages\* as an absolute number and percentage of overall decisions

Table 3

Statuses	2004				2005			
	First instance Number	%	Appeal Number	%	First instance Number	%	Appeal Number	%
No status awarded	40,525	88	43,760	78	22,740	83	27,090	79
Convention status	1,515	3	10,845**	19	1,945	7	5,905**	18
Humanitarian protection	155	0	-	-	125	0	-	-
Discretionary leave	3,840	8	-	-	2,685	10	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>46,035</b>		<b>55,975</b>		<b>27,495</b>		<b>33,995</b>	

Source: Home Office, Research Development and Statistics

Comments: Figures do not include dependants.

The statuses accorded at first instance and appeal stage do not necessarily relate to applications made in the same period.

Figures include asylum refusals after non-substantive consideration, for example refusals on non-compliance grounds and on safe third country grounds.

\* Appeal figures relate to appeals determined by the Immigration Appellate Authority/Asylum and Immigration Tribunal and do not include successful appeals at other appeal stages.

\*\* This figure includes successful appeals which resulted in awards of Convention status, Humanitarian Protection and Discretionary Leave.

Figures may not add up due to rounding.

## 7. Refugee recognition rates (1951 Convention: as an absolute number and as a percentage of total decisions) according to country of origin, at first instance and appeal stages\*

Table 4

	2004				2005			
	First instance		Appeal		First instance		Appeal	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Somalia	460	14	1,835	19	660	33	760	12
Eritrea	60	3	405	4	555	28	475	8
Zimbabwe	220	8	595	6	80	4	465	8
Sudan	120	8	445	4	70	3	400	6
Iran	80	3	985	10	70	3	740	12
DRC	55	3	400	4	65	3	305	5
Pakistan	75	7	410	4	45	2	225	3
Turkey	70	2	840	8	35	1	440	7
<b>Total countries</b>	<b>1,515</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9,545</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>1,945</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5,905</b>	<b>18</b>

Source: Home Office, Research Development and Statistics

Comments: Figures do not include dependants.

\* Appeal figures include Convention status grants, Humanitarian Protection and Discretionary Leave.

Appeal figures relate to appeals determined by the Immigration Appellate Authority/Asylum and Immigration Tribunal and do not include successful appeals at other appeal stages.

Figures may not add up due to rounding.

## 8. Subsidiary and other status granted (as an absolute number and as a percentage of total decisions) according to country of origin, at first instance and appeal stages\*

### Humanitarian Protection

Table 5

	2004				2005			
	First instance		Appeal		First instance		Appeal	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Iran	15	9	985	10	25	20	740	12
Afghanistan	10	6	325	4	20	16	200	3
Eritrea	25	16	405	4	15	12	475	8
Iraq	-	0	280	2	10	8	175	2
Sierra Leone	5	3	65	0	10	8	30	0

DRC	-	0	400	4	5	4	305	5
Somalia	10	6	1,835	19	5	4	760	12
Zimbabwe	**	1	595	6	**	1	465	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9,545</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5,905</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>countries</b>								

Source: Home Office, Research Development and Statistics

Comments: Figures do not include dependants.

Appeal figures relate to appeals determined by the Immigration Appellate Authority/Asylum and Immigration Tribunal and do not include successful appeals at other appeal stages.

\* Appeal figures include Convention status grants, Humanitarian Protection and Discretionary Leave.

\*\* = 1 or 2.

Figures may not add up due to rounding.

## Discretionary Leave

Table 6

	2004				2005			
	First instance		Appeal		First instance		Appeal	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Afghanistan	405	10	325	3	445	16	200	3
Iran	220	5	985	10	360	13	740	12
Somalia	455	11	1,835	19	190	7	760	12
DRC	175	9	400	4	150	5	305	5
Iraq	185	4	280	2	150	5	175	2
Bangladesh	275	7	10	0	140	5	10	1
Vietnam	220	5	45	0	135	5	20	0
Eritrea	155	4	405	4	125	4	475	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,840</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9,545</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>2,685</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5,905</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>countries</b>								

Source: Home Office, Research Development and Statistics

Comments: Figures do not include dependants.

\* Appeal figures include Convention status grants, Humanitarian Protection and Discretionary Leave.

Appeal figures relate to appeals determined by the Immigration Appellate Authority/Asylum and Immigration Tribunal and do not include successful appeals at other appeal stages.

Figures may not add up due to rounding.

## Returns, removals, detention and dismissed claims

### 9. Persons returned on safe third country grounds

Home Office, Research Development and Statistics provide figures for asylum seekers refused on safe third country grounds. In 2005, there were 1,780 such refusals. It is likely that most of these are to the EU under the Dublin Convention but separate figures by country are not published.

### 10. Persons returned on safe country of origin grounds

No figures available.

#### **11. Number of applications determined inadmissible**

No figures available.

#### **12. Number of asylum seekers denied entry to the territory**

No figures available.

#### **13. Number of asylum seekers detained, the maximum length of and grounds for detention**

Figures for the total number of asylum seekers detained throughout the year are not available. As at 31 December 2005, there were 1,450 asylum seekers detained under Immigration Act powers; 630 asylum seekers were detained for less than one month and 30 asylum seekers were detained for more than one year. People may be detained at any stage in the asylum process.

#### **14. Deportations of rejected asylum seekers**

See Question 15 below.

#### **15. Details of assisted return programmes, and numbers of those returned**

13,675 principal asylum applicants were removed from the UK in 2005 including enforced removals, persons departing 'voluntarily' following enforcement action initiated, persons leaving under the Assisted Voluntary Return Programme run by the International Organisation for Migration and those who it is established have left the UK without informing the immigration authorities. Including dependants, 15,850 asylum seekers were removed.

The nationalities with largest numbers of principal applicants removed or departing voluntarily in 2005 were asylum seekers from SAM\* (1,690), Afghanistan (1,155), Iraq (1,040), Turkey (855), Pakistan (670), Iran (620), Albania (560), India (470), and Sri Lanka (430).

\* SAM comprises the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Montenegro, and the province of Kosovo.

#### **16. Number of asylum seekers sent back to the Member State responsible for examining the asylum application under the Dublin II Regulation.**

No official figures available.

### Specific refugee groups

#### **17. Developments regarding refugee groups of particular concern**

##### **Zimbabwe**

In July 2005, all removals to Zimbabwe were suspended following a legal challenge where it was argued that to remove rejected asylum seekers to Zimbabwe was inherently unsafe since returning rejected asylum seekers were subject to persecution by the Zimbabwean authorities. The case was heard in the Court of Appeal in April 2006 and the court ordered that the Asylum and Immigration

Tribunal must rehear all aspects of the case, in particular whether people who return voluntarily are at the same risk. A differently constituted Tribunal delivered their decision in August this year and stated that there was no risk in general to those who returned involuntarily. The Tribunal identified a number of risk factors such as those with a history of military involvement and those with a history of criminal activity. The appellant has applied for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal and at the time of writing the application remains undecided. Following the decision of the Tribunal the Secretary of State announced that removals to Zimbabwe would resume.

## **Afghanistan**

The Government continued with forced removals to Afghanistan throughout 2005, despite the worsening security situation. The monthly maximum of 50, agreed informally with the Afghan Government, remained in force. The profile of those removed remained young, single males, with some heads of household, although it remained the Government's intention to remove families with children, including girls, 12 years old or over. To date, no families have been removed.

## **Iraq**

In July 2005, the UK Immigration Minister restated the Government's intention to commence removals to Iraq at the earliest opportunity. At the beginning of August, the Immigration Service detained a group of unsuccessful Iraqi asylum applicants with a view to removing them to Iraq at the end of that month; legal challenges ensued. Concern over the UK's policy was voiced by the main Kurdish political parties, and in early September, the Kurdistan Regional Government High Representative, Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, met the UK Immigration Minister to "seek a rethink by the British Government of its decision to forcibly return failed asylum seekers to Kurdistan." In the early hours of Sunday 20 November, 15 Iraqis were forcibly returned to northern Iraq via Cyprus, despite threats of legal action and pleas from refugee agencies to reconsider the planned returns. All 15 returnees were reported to have been left in Arbil (Northern Iraq) with reintegration assistance of \$100 (£58) each to help them re-establish themselves in their home country. It was also reported that the returnees were handcuffed and forced to wear military 'protective clothing' for the second part of the journey by military plane from Cyprus.

The opening up of air routes into Iraq had implications for Iraqis supported under the Section 4 'hard cases' concession of January 2005 (see Q 23 for more on Section 4), which allowed Iraqis to claim support without signing up for voluntary return. NASS makes no distinction in its treatment of applications for Section 4 support in respect of the area of Iraq from which the asylum seeker originates. The Home Office announced that from Monday 1st August a safe route of return was considered to exist for Iraqi asylum seekers whose asylum applications have been rejected. Therefore, from 1st August NASS required Iraqi asylum seekers who made a new application for Section 4 support to demonstrate that they satisfied one of the criteria for support. In most cases, this meant demonstrating they were taking all reasonable steps to leave the UK or were placing themselves in a position in which they will be able to leave the UK. From Thursday 1st September, Iraqi asylum seekers already in receipt of Section 4 support were expected to show they were taking steps to leave the UK, or satisfy one of the other grounds for Section 4 support, in order to continue to be eligible for that support. In most cases, it was clear that the choice they had to make was either to agree to leave voluntarily or to lose Section 4 support. At the time of writing, there have been no further forced removals to Iraq since November 2005.

## Legal and procedural developments

### 18. New legislation passed

#### Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006

The main piece of relevant legislation in 2005/06 was the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, which received Royal Assent in March 2006.

<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/20060013.htm>

The Act implements many of the measures outlined in the Government's five year plan on asylum and immigration, *Controlling our borders: making migration work for Britain*.

<http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/6353/aboutus/fiveyearstrategy.pdf>

Most of the Act's provisions reflect the immigration and nationality measures of the five-year plan and do not concern asylum.

However measures with implications for asylum seekers include:

- the intention to stop granting indefinite leave to remain (ILR) to recognised refugees, and the introduction of an appeal against a decision to remove or refuse to extend their right to remain in the UK
- measures to further strengthen border controls by fingerprinting all visa applications and carrying out electronic checks on people entering and leaving the country
- the introduction of an integration loan to replace the integration grant for those recognised as refugees
- the extension and consolidation of vouchers as a form of support for failed asylum seekers who are unable to return to country of origin
- the introduction of a number of counter terrorism measures, including a clause that extends the grounds on which the Government can exclude people from asylum.

The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 also includes measures to increase the Government's powers to strip citizenship from and deport those who they claim pose a serious risk to the UK's interests; and to speed up the appeals process in national security deportation cases.

The Refugee Council's overarching concern is that this Act will not assist in establishing an asylum system that identifies and assists refugees and others in need of international protection. We believe that the best way to establish a fair and efficient system is to get more asylum decisions right first time. We are concerned that the Government has failed to rectify the poor quality of initial asylum decisions.

Additionally, instead of granting ILR from the outset, asylum seekers who receive refugee status are now only granted five years leave, at the end of which their status will be subject to review. This runs counter to the Government's objective of encouraging and developing refugee integration and leaves those with status facing five years of uncertainty before knowing whether they will be able to remain in the UK indefinitely.

We are also concerned that Clause 43 of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 enables the Secretary of State to provide non-cash payments for non-accommodation related needs such as essential travel as a means of support for people at the end of the process who cannot be returned. The shortcomings of this system, both with regard to its efficiency, its detrimental and stigmatising effect on the individuals concerned, and the failure of retailers to accept the vouchers, was accepted by the Government in 2002 when it reintroduced cash payments for asylum seekers generally. We

can see no justification for reintroducing vouchers for a group of people who, by definition, are at the present time unable to return home.

## **Terrorism Act 2006**

The Terrorism Act 2006 received Royal Assent on 30<sup>th</sup> March 2006.  
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/20060011.htm>

Under the Act it is a criminal offence to directly or indirectly incite or encourage others to commit acts of terrorism. 'Encouraging' terrorism is broader than 'inciting' and includes the 'glorification' of terrorism.

The Government claims that the new offences are needed to act against organisations which try to promote terrorism and encourage people to think that suicide bombings are a "noble and holy activity"<sup>1</sup>. 'Glorification of terrorism' is now prohibited, regardless of whether the 'glorification' applies to terrorist acts in Britain or in other countries. Because terrorism is defined very broadly, this could mean that statements about violent opposition to regimes in other countries could be punishable in Britain. Taken in conjunction with the counter terrorism measures in the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, the Refugee Council and other agencies are concerned that those engaged in legitimate opposition to despotic regimes could be denied refugee protection in the UK.

## **19. Changes in refugee determination procedure, appeal or deportation procedures**

The most significant development in 2005/6 has been the rollout of the New Asylum Model (NAM) as discussed in the 2004 Report. This has passed from its pilot stage to a programme that is due to be fully implemented by April 2007. (See also Q 23 for more detail on the NAM).

There are some features of the NAM that are positive – in particular the allocation of a case owner to each case who will be responsible for the progress of the case (and will be contactable!) There is also a seeming acceptance by the Home Office of the need to provide legal advice to asylum seekers prior to their interview. For the NAM in Liverpool there has been a rota of solicitors to whom cases can be referred.

Less positive, however, is the fact that the system is wholly process driven, and preoccupied with adhering to timetables and operating to extremely tight deadlines, rather than ensuring that, for example, all the necessary evidence and information relating to an asylum claim has been gathered so that a full consideration of the asylum claim can take place. Asylum seekers in the NAM are interviewed as early as the sixth day after initial screening, despite all the demands of induction and dispersal. Newly arrived asylum seekers have learn about the country and the asylum system, to move to new accommodation twice, learn about health care and child care and any other service that they may require while in the UK. In addition, they have to find a solicitor, explain their case and receive legal advice in time for their interview on, or soon after, day six. Obtaining and translating documents in such a short timescale is particularly problematic and there is little evidence to date of NAM case owners being willing to exercise the flexibility to extend deadlines that they are, in theory, allowed.

The desire to move all asylum cases into the new system so rapidly (to avoid having two different determination systems in parallel for too long) means that new casework teams are being set up far faster than recruitment and training programmes and briefings and advice can be developed. The result is that, for example, at the time of writing there are NAM teams operating without named case

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<sup>1</sup> Statement by Charles Clarke, Home Secretary reported by the BBC 15<sup>th</sup> February 2006

owners, which was one of the main features of the new system. Existing briefings in Induction Centres make no reference to the NAM at all.

The Government is clear that its primary concern is to introduce more rapid processing of asylum claims leading, in most cases, to rapid removal. Hence the case owners' have end-to-end responsibility for managing their cases and there is a requirement that they maintain high levels of contact with their clients by setting criteria for reporting and/or electronic monitoring. Generally, people are required to report to one of a network of Reporting Centres, the frequency of reporting being set by their case owner and depending partly on fears of their absconding and partly on how easy the individual might be to remove. In addition in November 2005, the Minister announced that the use of electronic tagging was to be extended and that people would no longer have to give their consent – the alternative would be detention. The number of people being tagged (including on arrival) has increased accordingly and there is budgetary provision for 800 asylum seekers to be tagged in the year 2006/7. This is part of the overall Home Office strategy for much more rigorous reporting requirements for asylum seekers at all stages of the process.

## **20. Important case-law relating to the qualification for refugee status and other forms of protection**

The following is a summary of cases that have affected the interpretation of the Refugee Convention and the European Convention of Human Rights.

### **AA & LK (AIT and Court of Appeal) (See Q 17)**

In AA the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) considered the issue of the risk to failed asylum seekers forcibly returned to Zimbabwe. The Tribunal, after considering a large amount of evidence including a number of witnesses, found that the evidence all went one way and that Zimbabweans who were forcibly returned were at risk of ill-treatment. The Secretary of State sought to argue that the asylum seeker in this position ought not to be eligible for protection because voluntary return was an option open to every asylum seeker and that the ill-treatment could thus be avoided. The Tribunal stated that they were bound by a previous Court of Appeal decision and that the possibility of voluntary return was irrelevant in cases where an asylum seeker effectively stated that he did not wish to voluntarily return. The Tribunal allowed the appeal in 2005.

The Secretary of State appealed to the Court of Appeal and the case with joined with that of LK. The Court of Appeal stated that in cases where safe voluntary return was an option open to the asylum seeker, the fact that forced returns would give rise to ill-treatment did not mean that the asylum seeker qualified for protection. The Court of Appeal also stated that the Tribunal were wrong to state that the evidence all went one way and remitted the case of AA back to the AIT for reconsideration. The case of LK succeeded on the specific facts of the case and so only AA was remitted.

The Tribunal reheard the appeal of AA and delivered their verdict in August. In their decision they find that Zimbabweans who are forcibly returned are not at risk of persecution by virtue of having been failed asylum seekers. Instead the Tribunal approved the risk factors set out in the earlier Tribunal case of SM and Others (MDC – internal flight- risk categories) CG [2005] UKIAT 00100 which included those who had been politically active and teachers with actual or perceived political profiles. In addition, the Tribunal in AA added that those with a military history and those against whom there are outstanding and unresolved criminal issues.

The appellant has lodged an application with the Tribunal for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. At the date of writing that application remains outstanding.

## ZT v SSHD (Court of Appeal)

Ms ZT, a citizen of Zimbabwe, arrived in the UK country in July 2000, and was given leave to enter as a visitor for a period of 6 months. Fairly shortly thereafter she was diagnosed as being HIV-positive, and started a course of anti-retroviral treatment, which has succeeded in controlling the disease. In February 2001, she sought permission to remain on the basis that to return her to Zimbabwe, where treatment for her very serious illness would be difficult or impossible to obtain, would infringe her rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. The House of Lords in **N** in 2004 considered the return of a Ugandan woman with AIDS and stated that only the most exceptional of such cases could succeed under article 3. Ms ZT attempted to distinguish her case on 3 grounds:

- i. Unlike Uganda, which was making proper efforts to counter AIDS, the Zimbabwe government's policy of discriminatory application of health care had significantly contributed to the problem.
- ii. Ms ZT had only reported with AIDS after arriving in the UK. She was not therefore someone who came to the UK seeking healthcare.
- iii. The test of exceptionality should be applied as against the situation of other UK sufferers and not sufferers in Zimbabwe.

The Court rejected each of these submissions stating in turn that there was no special requirement to consider the behaviour of the receiving state, the timing of Ms ZT's contracting AIDS was irrelevant as she, like N, was seeking to remain in the UK on healthcare grounds, her fear was a fear of what would happen to her in Zimbabwe and so Zimbabwe was the proper country of reference. In considering Article 8 the Court revisited the concepts of a 'domestic' and 'foreign' case as set out in Ullah<sup>2</sup>. The appellant contended that her case was a domestic case as it related to the removal of her healthcare in the UK as opposed to the consequences of her return. The Court stated that it had never been suggested that different rules of law apply as between the two types of case; nor could it be, since they are both subject to the same rule of Article 8. They stated that the categorisation of cases as 'domestic' or 'foreign' did not affect the tests to be applied.

## Januzi & others v SSHD

The House of Lords considered two approaches to the interpretation of internal flight. The first approach is to be found in New Zealand jurisprudence and is based on Professor Hathaway's "The Law of Refugee Status" and can be summed up as a concept which "should be restricted in its application to persons who can genuinely access domestic protection, and for whom the reality of protection is meaningful. In situations where, for example, financial, logistical, or other barriers prevent the claimant from reaching internal safety; where the quality of internal protection fails to meet basic norms of civil, political, and socio-economic human rights; or where internal safety is otherwise illusory or unpredictable, state accountability for the harm is established and refugee status is appropriately recognized."<sup>3</sup>

The second approach was used by the Court of Appeal in E & others v SSHD and can be summed up as "a comparison between the conditions prevailing in the place of habitual residence and those which prevail in the safe haven, having regard to the impact that they will have on a person with the characteristics of the asylum seeker."<sup>4</sup>

The Court of Appeal in Januzi considered the two approaches and preferred the reasoning in E for five reasons:

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<sup>2</sup> Ullah (2004) UKHL 26 (HL)

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Januzi and others v SSHD Para 9 House of Lords February 2006

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in Januzi Para 24

1. there is nothing in any article of the Convention from which the Hathaway/New Zealand rule may by any process of interpretation be derived
2. acceptance of the Hathaway/New Zealand rule cannot properly be implied into the Convention
3. The Hathaway/New Zealand rule was not expressed in Council Directive 2004/83/EC<sup>5</sup> which was binding on the UK
4. The rule is not supported by uniformity of international practice or academic opinion
5. The Hathaway/New Zealand rule would give the Convention an effect that was anomalous in its consequences. The Court used the example of a refugee from a poor and deprived country who could, with no fear of persecution, live elsewhere in his country of nationality, but would there suffer all the drawbacks of living in a poor and backward country. The Court stated that it would be strange if the accident of persecution were to entitle him to escape, not only from that persecution, but from the deprivation to which his home country is subject.

The Court then considered the following extract from the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection of July 2003:

“National authorities are presumed to act throughout the country. If they are the feared persecutors, there is a presumption in principle that an internal flight or relocation alternative is not available.”<sup>6</sup>

The Court stated that there could be no such absolute rule and that the language of presumption was unhelpful. The Court stated that a decision maker should consider all the facts of the particular case and come to a decision based on an analysis of those facts.

## **21. Developments in the use of the exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention in the context of the national security debate**

As mentioned in Question 18, the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 and Terrorism Act 2006 are relevant developments. The Terrorism Act 2006 greatly broadened the definition of terrorism and the former then applies this to Article 1(F) and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention.

Under the Terrorism Act 2006 it is a criminal offence to incite or encourage, directly or indirectly, others to commit acts of terrorism. ‘Encouraging’ terrorism is broader than ‘inciting’ and includes the ‘glorification’ of terrorism. (See Q 18)

The Government’s statutory construction of Article 1F(c) is set out in Section 54 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 as follows:

(1) In the construction and application of Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Refugee Convention the reference to acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations shall be taken as including, in particular-

(a) acts of committing, preparing or instigating terrorism (whether or not the acts amount to an actual or inchoate offence), and

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<sup>5</sup> EU Council Directive 2004/83/EC April 2004 (OJ L 304.12) on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons.

<sup>6</sup> Quoted in Januzi Para 21

(b) acts of encouraging or inducing others to commit, prepare or instigate terrorism (whether or not the acts amount to an actual or inchoate offence).

UNHCR has specifically counselled against this construction and is concerned that “an automatic and non-restrictive use of Article 1F(c) to all acts designated as ‘terrorist’ may result in a disproportionate application of the exclusion clauses, in a manner contrary to the overriding humanitarian object and purpose of the 1951 Convention”. The Refugee Council fears that this statutory construction of Article 1F(c), taken in conjunction with the UK definition of terrorism, directly undermines one of the core purposes of the Refugee Convention: to provide protection for people seeking asylum on the grounds of persecution for political opinion. The breadth of the UK definition of terrorism, when used as the basis for exclusion, potentially means that thousands of asylum seekers who have fled persecution and would previously have been recognised in the UK as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention will now be denied refugee status.

Section 55 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 relates to asylum appeals where the Secretary of State issues a certificate that the asylum claimant, or recognised refugee, is not entitled to the protection from nonrefoulement under Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention because:

- (a) Article 1F of the 1951 Convention applies to him (whether or not he would otherwise be entitled to protection), or
- (b) Article 33(2) applies to him on grounds of national security (whether or not he would otherwise be entitled to protection).

This provision affects asylum seekers as well as refugees who have already been recognised by the UK as fulfilling the 1951 Refugee Convention definition. It means that if the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT), or the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), agrees with the Home Secretary's certificate, they are required to dismiss the asylum appeal before ever hearing it, and are not able to consider the individual's actions in the context of the Government against which they were directed.

The Refugee Council is concerned that this provision inappropriately fetters the discretion of the AIT and SIAC to look at actions in their context and could apply to a large number of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK. We have supported arguments that the provision is incompatible with the UK's obligations as a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention because it denies individuals a substantive appeal against a refusal of their asylum application, regardless of the fact that the quality of initial decisions made on asylum applications in the UK is unacceptably poor.

## **22. Developments regarding readmission and co-operation agreements**

The first UK bilateral readmission agreements were signed with Romania and Bulgaria in February 2003 and came into force on 6 June 2004. A bilateral readmission agreement was also signed with Albania on 14 October 2003, which came into force in July 2005. The UK signed a readmission agreement with Switzerland in December 2005, and with Algeria in July 2006, neither of which had entered into force by July 2006. Negotiations were finalised for a readmission agreement with Serbia & Montenegro but the agreement was never signed and its status is unclear following the referendum in favour of Montenegrin independence.

In addition to formal (Treaty) readmission agreements, the UK negotiates informal arrangements to address operational issues, often involving re-documentation issues. These are often termed Bilateral Memoranda of Understanding.

In 2005, the UK signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with Jordan, Libya and Lebanon with the aim of facilitating the deportation of individuals suspected of activities associated with terrorism.

The UK is also seeking to conclude such agreements with other states including Algeria, Morocco and Egypt. The Government claims that these MoUs will ensure that the human rights of deported terror suspects are fully protected. The Memoranda signed to date are framework documents which will form the basis for individual diplomatic assurances as to the safety of individual detainees.

The MoUs specify that, if detained following deportation, the deported person will be "afforded adequate accommodation, nourishment, and medical treatment, and will be treated in a humane and proper manner, in accordance with internationally accepted standards." None of the Memoranda contain express references to torture. Each provides for regular private visits from representatives of an independent body nominated jointly by both states, though the minimum frequency of the visits is different in each Memorandum.

NGOs and Human Rights Organisations have widely condemned the MoUs for their inability to guarantee the safety of those returned with such 'diplomatic assurances'. The influential UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights found in a recent inquiry that "The evidence we have heard in this inquiry, and our scrutiny of the Memoranda of Understanding agreed between the Government and the Governments of Libya, Lebanon and Jordan, have left us with grave concerns that the Government's policy of reliance on diplomatic assurances could place deported individuals at real risk of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, without any reliable means of redress."<sup>7</sup>

## The Social Dimension

### 23. Changes in the reception system

#### The New Asylum Model

In February 2005, the UK Immigration Minister announced the introduction of a New Asylum Model (NAM). The aim of this new model was to align asylum determination with support to achieve closer contact management and a more robust asylum system. The NAM consists of 6 reporting centres across the UK: Croydon, Liverpool, Leeds Solihull, Cardiff and Glasgow. Its key characteristics are:

- Changes in reception and determination timeframes so that asylum seekers should receive a decision on their claim within one month
- Changes to the use of existing structures such as initial accommodation
- The introduction of end to end case management, whereby every asylum seeker will be assigned a case owner who is responsible for all asylum support and determination decisions from the beginning to the end of process.
- The piloting of earlier legal advice provision and an emphasis on improving the quality of the decisions

The Home Office is establishing 25 NAM Teams, 12 people per team which will receive 5 new cases per head per month or 18,000 p.a. All decisions will be made within one month except where designated as "fast track" either because the claim is certified as "clearly unfounded"<sup>8</sup>; or "late and opportunistic"<sup>9</sup>. Fast track decisions are made by day eleven.

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<sup>7</sup> Joint Committee on Human Rights 19<sup>th</sup> Report - <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/185/18502.htm>

<sup>8</sup> Currently a list of 17 countries from which applications are generally considered "clearly unfounded" although claims can be certified from other countries.

<sup>9</sup> Generally where people have claimed asylum only after refusal of other leave or who are identified as illegally working.

The Refugee Council's concerns about the speed of the new process relate to the quality of initial decision making. The Home Office response to criticisms of poor quality decision making has been to invite UNHCR to examine its asylum casework in detail and make recommendations. The third UNHCR Quality Initiative report was published in May 2006.

[http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/6353/aboutus/QI\\_Third\\_Report.pdf](http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/6353/aboutus/QI_Third_Report.pdf)

One major recommendation has been that case owners making asylum decisions should be "accredited" (essentially they will have to pass an exam) just as legal representatives are. The Home Office is actively progressing accreditation of staff and has appointed a member of the UNHCR Quality Initiative Team to take this forward. It is still in the development phase, however, so NAM staff have yet to be accredited but in the meantime case owners are being appointed on a higher grade than other asylum decision makers, and with higher educational requirements.

## **NAM process**

The NAM is characterised by three processes:

- i. Segmentation
- ii. Fast track processing
- iii. Case ownership

### **(i) Segmentation**

During a person's initial screening interview at the Asylum Screening Unit, Immigration Officers assign their case to one of seven segments based on the asylum seeker's characteristics. The segments are:

Segment	1	Third Country Cases
	2	Minors (including UASC)
	3	Potential non detained NSA
	4	Late/Oppportunistic low barriers to removal <sup>10</sup>
	5	Late/Oppportunistic high barriers to removal
	6	General cases low barriers to removal
	7	General cases high barriers to removal

The differences between segments 6 and 7 are the reporting arrangements (weekly reporting for low barrier; monthly reporting for high barrier) and electronic monitoring arrangements.

Segmentation determines the processing, management and support pathways of each individual case and thus determines:

- the speed at which a person's asylum claim is processed;
- when they will have the initial interview;
- whether they will be assisted to access legal advice;
- what accommodation a person is required to occupy (e.g. highly supervised accommodation blocks; flats close to reporting centres or remote accommodation.)

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<sup>10</sup> Claimants are assessed as low or high barriers to removal primarily according to IS Documentation Unit advice based on their nationality and level of documentation. Those with valid documentation; or who can be removed on an EU letter; or for whom documentation can be obtained within a month are classified as low barriers to removal.

- how and when a person is required to report to the Immigration Service, that is, whether this will be by voice recognition or appearance in person weekly or daily. Compliance with these reporting requirements will be a condition of continuing support.

IND may create a tenth segment called “well founded” for people with strong claims to accelerate determination. IND is consulting the UNHCR on this process and it is unclear how it will operate.

## **(ii) Fast track processing**

The NAM uses a fast track procedure piloted in Harmondsworth detention centre and the North West Pilot. It accelerates the assessment process by removing the formal application form stage and proceeding straight to interview as well as integrating casework for detained and non-detained applicants. It reduces the time from initial interview to initial decision from two months to two weeks.

## **(iii) Case ownership**

The NAM has a single case owner case management model. The case owner is responsible for each asylum seeker throughout the process – from application to the granting of status or removal. Case owners will be employed at a higher grade. Their roles and responsibilities include:

- producing case management plans for each asylum applicant ensuring that their case is dealt with within the stipulated timescales.
- moving cases from one segment to another if they have been inappropriately allocated (the process for doing this remains unclear).
- making case decisions, handling appeals, ensuring appropriate support and reporting arrangements, arranging re-documentation, and handling removals casework.

Applicants will increasingly receive the decision on their asylum claim in person when they report. Detention is increasingly possible at the final decision stage if the decision is for the person to be removed.

## **Organisational changes resulting from NAM – the end of centralised NASS**

The National Asylum Support Service (NASS) has been decentralised. All casework will be regionalised by the end of 2006 aligning it with the new asylum processing systems introduced by NAM. Asylum support is now divided between two directorates: Asylum Resources and Regional Operations and Dispersal which sit within the Asylum Directorate.

Eventually this means that the NAM caseworker will be the key contact point on all aspects of a case and will be making asylum claim and support decisions.

## **New accommodation provision contracts**

The National Asylum Support Service procured accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees in February 2006 under a new, more tightly specified and less expensive contract with private and public sector accommodation providers. The new contracts will deliver a saving of £177 million against the Home Office's original £450 million target for accommodation procurement, and the cost per service user per day has been reduced by 11%, representing a saving of £15 million.

All existing contracts end by 1 July 2006 with new contracts all being active from September 2006. Interim arrangements have been achieved in most cases for asylum seekers to remain in their

accommodation and the new provider to accept responsibility for the management of the accommodation. However in some instances this has not been possible and some asylum seekers have had to move from their accommodation, with some having to move to initial accommodation while new appropriate accommodation is sourced. The combination of this transition process with a new business process for agreeing dispersals with accommodation providers has resulted in significant drop in dispersals and a significant increase in the number of people in initial accommodation.

NGOs are concerned to ensure that families are not disrupted, nor their welfare jeopardised through being moved to another region, and that normal dispersal continues.

## Update on existing provision

Section 4 of the [1999 Asylum and Immigration Act](#) (also known as 'hard case' support) enables those people whose asylum claim has been rejected (including at appeal) and who are no longer able to receive full NASS support to apply for reduced provision of accommodation and food. There are very strict criteria for receiving this support: either a willingness to return to their country of origin voluntarily; or an inability to return, recognised as such by the Home Office.

Section 4 continues to be heavily subscribed and hampered by poor administration and policy issues.

- The Government continues to struggle with the administration of the system as demand for Section 4 support has increased significantly with the acceleration of initial and appeal stage decision making. Through most of 2005 the average wait for a response to an application for section 4 support for a person considered not to immediately vulnerable was 8 weeks – during which time they are destitute. The average amount of time a person remains on Section.4 support is 260 days due to difficulties associated with voluntary return, re-documentation, fresh claims, judicial reviews and health care issues.
- People receive £35 food vouchers per week, irrespective of age or need. The vouchers fail to adequately meet people's needs, particularly those which fall outside toiletries and food. They do not provide for clothing. Support issues relating to people supported under section 4 for over six months and provision for women and babies are being considered separately by the Home Office. Until the secondary legislation is laid and provisions implemented, NGOs continue to meet this area of need from their own funds.
- People receiving section 4 support who have special needs continue to experience difficulties accessing additional support to meet these needs from Local Authorities, despite recent legal challenges proving this right [AW v LB Croydon and SSHD and A, D and Y v LB Hackney and SSHD Case nos CO/2016/2005, CO/6016/2004, CO/3433/2004, CO/3110/2005.]

Section 10 of the [Asylum and Immigration Act 2004](#) allows for the Secretary of State [SoS] to make a person's eligibility for Section 4 "hard case" support "conditional upon his performance of or participation in community activities in accordance with arrangements made by the SoS". This provision has remained dormant since the Government's failed attempt to implement it through a partnership with YMCA Liverpool. The YMCA, in line with other voluntary sector organisations, has now chosen not to participate due to reservations about forced labour. The Government is likely to reinstitute this provision as part of the NAM which envisages increased contact with people supported at the end of the asylum process.

Section 9 of the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 withholds any support from families that do not satisfy the Government that they are complying with attempts to remove them from the UK. The Government has said that if a family becomes destitute as a result of this provision the only support available will be for the children under section 20 of the Children's Act (the provision for taking

children into care). The Government piloted the provision with 116 families in Leeds, London and Manchester between December 2004-July 2005. The Home Office conducted an evaluation of the pilot in November 2005 but the findings and the Government stance on the future implementation of the provision have yet to be made public. An evaluation response by a number of NGOs identified that the provision fails to achieve any of the Government objectives, jeopardises the safety and well being of families at the end of the asylum process, is expensive and cumbersome to administer, and fails to recognise the complex context facing families at the end of the process. Key concerns for NGOs and local government centre on the rights of the child, both under UK law, and under Article 8 of the ECHR (right to family).

Section 55 of the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act stopped the provision of support for childless adults who did not apply for asylum 'as soon as reasonably practicable' after arriving in the UK. This policy was effectively abandoned for people seeking accommodation and support after the decision of the House of Lords on hearing the Government's appeal against the May 2004 Court of Appeal Limbuela Judgement that denial of accommodation and support was a violation of a person's Article 3 of the ECHR rights if it forced someone into destitution. The Government is, however, still applying Section 55 to all 'late' applications for subsistence-only support (i.e. support without accommodation).

## **24. Changes in the social welfare policy relevant to refugees**

The Family ILR (Indefinite Leave to Remain) Amnesty exercise<sup>11</sup> continues to receive applications from families who were unable or unaware of the October 2003 deadline. Families are still able to apply to the Home Office for consideration of their family's eligibility for ILR under the amnesty if they fit the original criteria. Several legal challenges are underway, challenging the criteria for the amnesty and seeking the extension of the deadline.

## **25. Changes in policy relating to refugee integration**

Refugee integration loans were introduced in the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 removing the entitlement to back dated social security payments of people who are granted refugee or complementary protection status. Instead, from October 2006 they will be eligible for refugee integration loans.

Currently, asylum seekers who are granted full refugee status are entitled to claim the difference between NASS support payments and mainstream benefit levels. The claim for backdated benefits must be made within 28 days of receiving the asylum decision and can be backdated to the date of the original asylum claim. The Home Office is developing mechanisms for administering Refugee Integration Loans with the Department of Work and Pensions, which will recover the loan repayments.

Refugee and asylum seeker representatives and NGOs opposed the abolition of back-dated benefits and their replacement with integration loans because of concerns that integration loans: undermine refugees' rights as UK residents, entitled to benefit support from the time of making a claim; will jeopardise access to mainstream support; will not be universal; and will lock refugees into debt related poverty instead of enabling them move on with rebuilding their lives.

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<sup>11</sup> See the Home Office website for eligibility details at <http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/asylumpolicyinstructions/apunotices/oneoffexercise.pdf?view=Binary>

## 26. Changes in family reunion policy

In August 2005, when the Government introduced a policy of granting only five years limited leave to recognised Convention refugees, it also amended the rules relating to those granted Humanitarian Protection (HP). The previous period of three years leave was increased to five years to bring them in line with those with Refugee Status. For the first time, those granted Humanitarian Protection were entitled to apply for immediate family reunion.

## Other policy developments

### 27. Developments in resettlement policy

The Home Office (HO) refugee resettlement programme is known as the Gateway Protection Programme. The target is to bring in up to 500 refugees per year. The HO provides specific funding for resettled refugees' support for 12 months from arrival and to date has contracted NGOs to provide this support, while providing additional finance for the first 12 months to health and education agencies to meet the additional costs of services.

The following groups of refugees have been resettled to the UK over the year

Burmese	Thailand	51	May 05	Sheffield
Sudanese	Uganda	85	Nov 05 – Feb 06	Bolton and Bury
Congolese (DRC)	Zambia	115	March – April 06	Hull and Rochdale

An increasing number of local authorities are committed to resettlement programmes in their districts, though so far there are none in Scotland or Wales, and only one (Brighton) in the south of England. So far also, only one local authority has run the programme itself with no major voluntary sector input (Rochdale), though a number of local authorities have helped to provide housing. Two local authorities so far (Sheffield and Bolton) have accepted two groups of resettled refugees each into their districts and the success of the programme there and elsewhere is encouraging other local authorities to become involved, whether as direct providers or enablers.

The HO is still committed to individual selection of refugees for resettlement via missions, rather than the dossier-based selection approach recommended by the UNHCR.

Formal evaluations so far (HO and voluntary sector) have confirmed that operationally the first two programmes have been very successful. There is also evidence that the focussed HO support for health services and education in the early stages is improving outcomes for refugees in the longer term (e.g. intensive health support early on reduces the demands made by refugees on health services later, to the level of, or lower than, the wider population). Investment in initial services at the induction stage is also having spin-off benefits for other refugee and asylum groups

There is still no specific HO policy on family reunion for resettled refugees, which is a major issue for the resettled refugees now in the UK. The Home Office's new policy of giving most new UK refugees only temporary refugee status initially (for five years, then review) will not apply to resettled refugees. They will be treated as a special case and receive permanent refugee status immediately.

### 28. Developments in return policy

In 2005, the Prime Minister announced a new Government target to remove more refused asylum seekers than there were fresh claims in any given month. This became known as the "tipping target"

which the Home Office sought to achieve by the end of 2005. The deadline was not met by the end of 2005, but the target was reached for the months of February and March 2006. There are widespread concerns among NGOs that concentration on this target has led to neglect in other areas of asylum policy, such as improving the quality of initial asylum decisions.

During 2004 and 2005, there was a sustained campaign on the detention of children and families in Scotland which focussed on the only Removal Centre in Scotland - Dungavel house in South Lanarkshire. The campaign challenged the detention of children, as well as the manner of the removal process – so called “dawn raids” whereby immigration officers descend on a family in significant numbers, in protective clothing, demand entry, handcuff children and leave the family enough time only to gather a few personal belongings before taking them to Dungavel. The whole process has been condemned by NGOs as disproportionate and unnecessarily traumatising, especially for children. Particular concern was raised around issues of child protection when it was discovered that six children were detained and removed whilst they were subject to investigations by the Scottish Children’s Reporter into allegations of child abuse.

Following a widespread media campaign, criticism by the Scottish Children’s Commissioner and a debate in the Scottish Parliament, Jack McConnell, the First Minister of Scotland spoke out and criticised the practice and its impact on asylum-seeking children and communities in Glasgow. This has led the UK government to carry out a review of its procedures of forcibly removing families in the whole of the UK.

The Government’s return programme for unaccompanied children, announced in February 2005, is still being developed. Whilst the Government’s position has not changed, i.e. unaccompanied children who are considered by HO not to be in need of international protection, will only be returned if safe reception arrangements can be made for them, the programme being developed means that children could be returned in wider circumstances than previously. The Government is currently negotiating with various governments and NGOs to put into place a package of accommodation and support for unsuccessful asylum seekers under the age of 18 who will be returned. These negotiations are currently being actively pursued in Vietnam and Angola; further work is planned to explore the possibility of programmes being developed in Democratic Republic of Congo and Albania. Fears around the safety of these young people are based on the difficulty in ensuring that the international protection needs of all unaccompanied children seeking asylum have been fully addressed by the Home Office, as well as the lack of an independent best interests determination as part of the planned process.

## **29. Developments in border control measures**

The Home Office is seeking to fully implement its e-borders project by 2008, resulting in a system that can identify people who have boarded transport destined for the UK, check them automatically against databases of individuals who pose a ‘security risk’, and keep an electronic record of entry into the country. The system will also enable authorities to record people leaving the UK, and identify those who overstay. Undoubtedly, it will also make it increasingly difficult for refugees fleeing persecution to reach safety in the UK.

The Home Office continues to prioritise enhanced border control measures, and participates in a wide range of EU border control projects.

## **30. Other developments in refugee policy: Scotland**

Whilst asylum and immigration legislation is reserved to the UK Parliament at Westminster, the support services that impact on asylum seekers and refugees are entirely the responsibility of the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh. Education, employment, police protection, housing, legal aid,

children and social work services are all areas where legislation, policy and practice are devolved. Scotland currently houses approximately 10% of the UK asylum-seeking population, mainly in the city of Glasgow.

## **Integration in Scotland**

The Scottish Refugee Integration Forum (SRIF) reported in February 2005 on its work towards delivering integration goals for refugees in Scotland. SRIF was set up by the Scottish Executive in 2003 to identify key actions which would make a real difference to the lives of refugees in Scotland and has focussed on issues of positive images, community development, housing, justice, children's services, health and social care, enterprise, lifelong learning, employment and training. Through SRIF, the Scottish Executive continues to promote integration as a process which should happen when asylum seekers first arrive in Scotland. This approach differs from the National UK Refugee Integration Strategy which was published in March 2005. A new SRIF action plan is currently being developed and will be published in 2006

## **Discourse on immigration and the political context in Scotland**

There are clear differences between the way immigration is perceived in Scotland and elsewhere in the UK. Concerns about a declining birth rate (the fastest in Europe), out-migration and skills shortages in Scotland have created a more favourable discourse on immigration. This was most noticeable during the UK General Elections in 2005 where anti-asylum and immigration rhetoric was far less heard from political parties in Scotland. The Scottish Executive is committed to tackling racism and promoting race equality in Scotland Throughout 2005, it has continued to run a high-profile anti-racist media campaign, *One Scotland*. This campaign has included specific references to refugees.

The declining demographic in Scotland has also led the Scottish Parliament to challenge the UK Government's refusal to allow asylum seekers to work. In November, the European and External Affairs Committee of the Scottish Parliament published a report into Fresh Talent, a major initiative designed to attract more people to move and settle in Scotland. Whilst the right to employment of those awaiting a decision on asylum is not devolved, the Committee asked the Scottish Executive to consider issues of assistance into employment and integration into communities that could be addressed within the context of Fresh Talent. The Committee also urged the Executive, in its discussions with the Home Office, to make the case for employment opportunities for asylum seekers.

## **Legal Aid**

The Scottish Executive continues not to restrict the amount of legal aid available to asylum seekers to assist their asylum application as has happened elsewhere in the UK. There are, however, continued problems where people have engaged a lawyer in England and then find themselves dispersed to Glasgow. English lawyers are not allowed to practice in Scotland and vice versa.

## **8. Political context**

### **31. Government in power during 2005**

The Labour Party was in power throughout 2005, but with a reduced majority following the election in May 2005.

### **32. Governmental policy vis-à-vis EU developments**

The UK's policy vis-à-vis EU developments is to participate in all asylum measures where the Government deems it to be in the UK's interests, and to refrain from participation where there are significant differences between EU measures and those in the UK. In line with this policy, the UK decided not to participate in the Returns Directive, because the Government felt that the changes required to domestic practise would create unnecessary bureaucratic and administrative burdens. The Government's official line is, however, that increased co-operation with international partners, including EU member states, is central to managing migration and other global issues. In this light, the UK is keen to support joint efforts where they clearly further the UK's interests, as for example the Government believes is the case with joint charter removal operations.

### **33. Asylum in the national political agenda**

Immigration and asylum remained high on the political and media agenda. Opinion polls throughout the year showed that asylum and immigration was one of the top four policy concerns of the public.

The main opposition party, the Conservative Party, under the new leadership of David Cameron, has sought to distance itself from the anti-asylum rhetoric used in the 2005 General Election. David Cameron has committed himself to protecting and supporting refugees in the UK. He has launched a comprehensive policy review that will be complete in 2007.

A series of political controversies involving the Home Office, and the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) in particular, has resulted in the sacking of the Home Secretary (the UK's Interior Minister post) and a reshuffle of Junior Ministers. The new Home Secretary has described IND as "not fit for purpose" and has promised to turn it around in 100 days. Although the controversies have largely focused on non-asylum immigration, the Government is highlighting the increased numbers of forced removals of refused asylum seekers as evidence of its success in dealing with the issue.

## **Biography**

### **Authors**

Refugee Council staff in the Mainstreaming Policy Team, Protection Policy Team, and Information and Marketing Team contributed to this report. Scottish Refugee Council and Refugee Legal Centre contributions were also incorporated in this report.

### **Name of organisation**

Refugee Council

### **Mission statement**

The Refugee Council is the largest non governmental organisation in the UK working with asylum seekers and refugees. We not only give help and support, but also work with asylum seekers and refugees to ensure their needs and concerns are addressed.

### **Website address**

[www.refugeecouncil.org.uk](http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk)